

New Week 9

Empirical and Historical Dimensions of Pragmatic Reason Relations

Intro:

Last time I started off with some further distinctions that make our normative pragmatic metavocabulary more expressively powerful, by highlighting important differences of *social perspective* in the normative fine structure of discursive practice.

- First is the distinction between normative *statuses*, such as commitment and entitlement to commitments, responsibility, and authority, and normative *attitudes of taking or treating* someone *as* having such statuses.
- Second is the distinction of two basic kinds of normative attitude: *attributing* a status to some *else* and *acknowledging* or *claiming* that status *oneself*.

One issue I did not pursue, that we will follow up on today, is **how to understand the relations between normative statuses and normative attitudes**: does one come first, in the order of explanation or explicitation? Or are they co-ordinate and coeval, only to be understood together?

The principal task last time was to look at how the distinction between these two sorts of attitude, differing in their social perspective ('I' and 'you'—the archaic 'thou'), is manifested in the distinction between two sorts of attitude-explicating locutions: ascriptions of propositional attitude *de dicto* and ascriptions of propositional attitude *de re*.

We can compare the way *ascriptions* make *attributions* explicit (put them in the form of claimables for which reasons can be given and demanded) on the side of *pragmatics* and the way *conditionals* and *negation* make *reason relations* explicit.

The (I hope and trust) tantalizing claim was made that **the principal representational locutions of ordinary language**—the expressions we use to make explicit what we are talking or thinking *of* or *about*, by contrast to what we are saying or thinking about it—**can be functionally identified by their role in marking off the crucial distinction of scope within *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitude** between commitments *undertaken* or *acknowledged* and those *attributed*.

That is, **what one is *doing* in talking and thinking *about* what we are talking or thinking *about***—the representational dimension of talk and thought—**is marking the distinction between commitments *attributed* to others and those one *acknowledges* oneself**.

The challenge is to begin to understand the *significance* of this observation about the connection between the representational dimension of language, as made explicit in a *semantic* MV, and this distinction of social perspective between practical normative attitudes, as made explicit in a *pragmatic* MV.

That this phenomenon is real, or at least not *just* the result of an idiosyncratic analysis, is evidenced by the possibility of pragmatically understanding what one *doing* in taking someone to *know* something (that things are thus-and-so), in terms of the **JTB triad**:

- one is taking them to *believe*, so *attributing a commitment* (to accept *p*),
- one is taking them to be *justified*, that is *entitled* to that belief/commitment, so *attributing an entitlement*, and
- one is taking that commitment to be *true*, that is, one is *acknowledging* that *commitment* (to accept *p*) *oneself*.

Here the difference between the belief condition and the truth condition corresponds pragmatically to the distinction between *attributing* a commitment to another, and *acknowledging* that commitment oneself.

For us, this problematic is connected to another one. We said earlier that **the Hlobil isomorphism** shows that the crucial representational connections between discursive practice, conceptual content, and worldly states of affairs is to be found at the level of *reason relations*. So we must face the additional question of how the lesson about

- i) what we are *doing* when we use some paradigmatic representational locutions that derives from understanding the use of *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitude to make explicit the distinction of social perspective between attributing and acknowledging normative statuses,

relates to

- ii) the intelligibility of an isomorphism between what language-users *take* to follow from or rule out what and what *really*, objectively, follows from or rules out what.

The connection, I will be claiming today, is that **the practices by which we navigate the social doxastic gulf between commitments attributed and those acknowledged**, which shows up in the distinction of conceptual content between propositional attitude ascriptions *de re* and *de dicto* is one crucial aspect of what ***institutes, maintains, and improves the isomorphism*** between social-practical reason relations and objective-metaphysical relations of consequence and incompatibility.

The aspect of discursive practices that consists in navigating between different social-perspectival attitudes articulates the *normative governance* of representings by representeds that is the *deontic-normative* companion of *subjunctive tracking* relations specified in *alethic modal* vocabulary.

It is these together that induce and produce **the Hlobil isomorphism between words and the world** at the level of reason relations.

The conclusion will be that **the aspect of the representational dimension of discourse that *de re* ascriptions make explicit is the *normative governance* of representings by representeds, the sense in which representings are *responsible to the representeds* they thereby count as *representings of***, in that the *representeds* serve as normative standards, *authoritative* for assessments of the correctness of the representings *as* representings of those representeds.

So we should look at the pragmatic conditions that establish the Hlobil isomorphism (more or less an isomorphism, but *ideally* so).

This is addressing the question of *philosophical* semantics, as opposed to the *formal* semantics Fine does— but this is not fair. KF has a metaphysical story.

Philosophical semantics (as I am using the term) includes a *pragmatic* story about how the relations between semantic contents and semantically contentful items comes about, or what it consists in.

Start with **toy acid* story, from Sellars:**

Initially, one has a concept of acid*, where one uses the term as including the circumstances of appropriate application that whatever tastes sour is an acid, and with the appropriate consequences of application that acids always turn Litmus paper red.

One can then find oneself confronted by a liquid that tastes sour and turns Litmus paper blue.

Appealing to our shared, convergent practices of noninferentially classifying things as sour and red/blue, we then find ourselves with a constellation of commitments that are *incompatible, by our own lights*, that is, according to the reason relations that articulate our own concepts.

The world is telling us that the inference curled up in our concept of acid*, in virtue of using it with those circumstances and consequences of application, does not hold objectively.

This story indicates how reason relations/conceptual contents can *develop*, and become *better*.

That is, there is a *progressive* assessment put in play. Some developments are *better* than others.

Can then investigate:

First, empirical dimension,

Then, historical dimension.

Historical will give us the internal notion of progress, Hlobil isomorphism gives us an external notion of progress.

Outline:

I. The Empirical Dimension of Pragmatic Reason Relations

Thinking about the pragmatics of using *descriptive empirical concepts*:

- a) *Declarativism* about conceptual contents: Picks out conceptual contents in terms of the use of declarative sentences. Sellars teaches us to understand the latter in terms of “location in a space of implications”, which we also learn must be *subjunctively robust* implications-and-incompatibilities.
This is why “description and explanation go hand in hand”: description requires location in a space of implications, and that they are subjunctively robust ensures that descriptions stand to one another in potentially *explanatory* relations, which invoke the intensions=conceptual contents in the form of *ranges of subjunctive robustness* of reason relations of implications-and-incompatibilities. This is distinguished from mere behavioral affordances (“labeling” by differential response).
- b) When we notice that “S ought to Φ ,” is a perfectly good declarative sentence, we will want to distinguish these *prescriptive* cases from *descriptive* or representational cases such as “S has read that book.” So we are after a narrower class of conceptual contents (on our way to *empirical, descriptive* contents).

We can get that by appealing to **Anscombe’s “direction of normative fit”** observations

She contrasts two lists: the **shopper’s** list and the **detective’s** list, by where the fault (impropriety) lies if the items in the cart do not match the items on the list. For the shopper, the cart is wrong and the list is right, while for the detective the cart is right and the list is wrong.

Anscombe’s story of the two lists:

- **The shopper’s list is authoritative for, in the sense of providing the standard for assessments of correctness of items in the cart.**
- **The items in the cart are authoritative for, in the sense of providing the standard for assessments of the correctness of the detective’s list.**

This shows us the essential difference of *normative direction of fit* between

- **the *prescriptive* pragmatic significance of the shopper’s list and**
- **the *descriptive* pragmatic significance of the detective’s list.**

We can think of that in terms of *authority* and *responsibility*: the shopper's list is *authoritative over* the items put in the cart, while the detective's list is *responsible to* those items, which are authoritative over it.

And we can compare Anscombe's distinction with what I claim Hegel made of **Kant on the essentially normative character of the metaconcept of representation**.

For Kant saw that representings as such are *responsible* for their correctness *to* what counts as represented by them just in virtue of serving as an *authoritative* normative standard of correctness (*as* a representing) for those descriptive representings.

We can use this normative criterion to distinguish *descriptive*, that is representational, uses from *prescriptive* ones. For *prescriptions* specify how things are to (be made to) be: the representing is authoritative over the represented state of affairs, rather than the other way around.

Note that descriptive/prescriptive are just **the two basic directions of normative fit**.

Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) cycles are describe-prescribe-describe-exit cycles, with conditional branched-schedule algorithms at their heart.

It follows that

Requiring the descriptive direction of normative fit carves out a proper subclass of declaratives.

- c) Claim: **This normative governance of representings by representeds, of descriptions by describeds, is the representational dimension of concept-use that is expressed explicitly by the use of *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitude.** For these mark assessments (at the level of attitudes) of representings-describings by comparison to their representeds-describeds.
- d) We see that the distinction of social perspective that underlies the *de dicto/de re* distinction goes beyond the Kantian represented/representing. It articulates two different rational perspectives on the behavior of another. It is often thought that only "beliefs *de dicto*" involve predictions/explanations of others' behavior. **If Nicole believes of a cow that it is a deer**, and is hunting seeking relief from dead deerlessness, we can predict she will try to shoot. But the *de re* specification is also relevant to explaining/predicting her behavior, for the *de re* specification underwrites the prediction that if she hits what she is aiming at, she will kill a cow, not a deer. *De dicto* specifies what she will *try* to do, while *de re* specifies what she will *succeed* in doing.
- e) When we notice that "2+2=4", "Kindness is a virtue," and "Torts are civil wrongs," are all descriptive representations in this sense—that they all have the descriptive constellation of representational authority and responsibility—without being *empirical*

descriptions, we see that a further condition will be required. (Note that all these kinds of claimables admit the *de re/de dicto* distinction when they are ascribed.)

The model of observation: also need RDRDs.

What I call Sellars's "Two-ply Account of Observation" has a *normative* component, in that observings must be taking up stances in a normative space of reasons, articulated by a space of normatively significant implications. But it also has reliable differential responsive dispositions, RDRDs, underwritten by reliably covariant causal chains. In the toy "acid*" story, it is these subjunctively *reliable* connections, characterizable in an alethic modal vocabulary, that *control* the evolution of the concept under constraint by incompatible commitments.

Proposal: Second Dimension. Subjunctive tracking of described by describing

Add to the requirement that representings be normatively governed by representeds the requirement that representings subjunctively track representeds.

The issue is *subjunctive sensitivity* of representings to representeds: if the represented *were* different, the representing *would be* different.

Other accounts are of two kinds: normative *or* alethic. On the account I am suggesting, they are literally **one-sided**. Figures such as Dretske and Fodor want to have the subjunctive tracking ("one-way counterfactual dependences") do *all* the work of *both* normative governance *and* subjunctive tracking.

What we are looking *for*, and maybe even looking *at*, is how *objective* consequential and incompatibility relations can shape *subjective* consequential and incompatibility relations: how what *really* follows from what gets incorporated in what discursive practitioners *take* to follow from what.

f) **Normative/Alethic** [This is a punchline, and raises a good question.]:

This understanding of a representational relation between the *use* of some concepts and what they can be understood to represent is double-barreled. It requires normative governance of representings *by* representeds and subjunctive sensitivity of representings *to* representeds. Normative governance we discuss in a *deontic normative* metavocabulary, of *authority* and *responsibility, assessment of correctness*. Subjunctive sensitivity or tracking we discuss in an *alethic modal* metavocabulary of subjunctively robust reason relations. We have seen this pairing before: the Hlobil isomorphism relates reason relations specifiable in bilateral normative pragmatic MVs with reason relations (and so conceptual contents) specifiable in truthmaker alethic modal MVs.

Now we see the same deontic/alethic pairing in the form of the duo of normative governance and subjunctive sensitivity.

Both of these kinds of metavocabulary are being employed *within* a pragmatic metavocabulary that discusses the *use* of linguistic expressions.

This is one way in which the use even of basic vocabularies can be said to have a representational dimension even already as described in a *pragmatic* metavocabulary.

For at this formal level, the relations between what is expressed by pragmatic MVs and what is expressed in semantic MVs (deontic/alethic) are mirrored *within* pragmatic MVs.

Q: How does this mirroring, *within* the pragmatics, of the deontic/alethic bimodal conceptual realism relating pragmatics to semantics-metaphysics, relate to that larger structure?

- g) Finally, we can ask about **metalinguistic claims and concepts**, whether *they* can have an empirical descriptive aspect. Here I have in mind Sellars's
 - i) *metalinguistic analysis* of talk of *universals*, norms, *alethic modality*, *semantic* talk of truth and propositions, and
 - ii) *nominalism* about such things: they are not “in the world in the ‘narrow’ sense of ‘in the world’”.

I think there is something right about this thought, though when I am speaking carefully and perspicuously, ‘real’ is not one of my words.

Proposal: Can distinguish, *within* the class of *empirical, descriptive* concepts—which I have suggested is a class of metalinguistic concepts whose use is *both*

- i) normatively governed by and
- ii) subjunctively tracking of what it is *about*—by looking at whether in addition
- iii) the *subjunctive tracking* of representeds by representings is *essentially mediated* by *other* claimings-representings-describings, in the vocabulary for which the metavocabulary in question is a metavocabulary.

I think this is what Sellars means by “not ‘in the world’ in the ‘narrow sense’”: these would not be true unless there were speakers of the base vocabularies.

In this sense, *legal* statuses and the concepts and reason relations articulating them are not “in the world in the narrow sense.”

- h) The question remains: how does it come about that some concepts *are* both normatively governed by *and* subjunctively sensitive to how things objectively are? For this we need to look at the *processes* and *practices* by which reason relations, and so conceptual contents, *change*. That is **the historical dimension of language use**.

II. The Historical Dimension of Pragmatic Reason Relations

- a) Our interest is in the *process* whereby the reason relations discursive practitioners in a community practically *take* or *treat as* holding objectively change and develop over time, so as better to instantiate the Hlobil isomorphism.

We theorists, helping ourselves to metaphysical specifications of reason relations in a TM semantic MV can say what it *is* for the norms implicit in their practices to be isomorphic with the actual relations of consequence-and-incompatibility among worldly propositions.

We are now interested in seeing **what can be said from within a pragmatic MV about progress toward that goal, and what processes can be expected to secure such progress.**

Unchecked Retrospective Authority Challenge: Here the big worry, the big challenge, is that purely *retrospective* criteria of progress are too easy to satisfy. It seems as though we could *always* tell a story that came out with later in our past/history being better, even if we have to invent new, fluid criteria of adequacy, such as pleasingness to God.

The question is how to understand the possibility of the past constraining us in a *normative* sense, that is, as having genuine *authority*, given that the past is not there to enforce or interpret it. Why can't the present-and-future call whatever they like "progress"? This is a challenge to *us* to **define "progress" in a way that genuinely normatively constrains present-and-future concept-appliers ("judges")**, in the sense of at least saying what *genuinely* acknowledging that authority, and not simply substituting one's own hermeneutic authority.

Here are two, perhaps surprising, responses to that challenge:

b) **Technology:**

My original answer (only obscurely published, in Polish technology project):

In the case of *empirical* concepts, as in (I), we can discipline assessments of *theoretical* progress by the relatively independent assessments of *technological* progress. Here my innovation is a novel account of the *functional* division of labor between the two. It depends on defining 'technological progress' in a way that appeals essentially to *prospective* assessments. This is a distinctive constellation of authority and responsibility by past and present assessors, which ensures that the present-and-future is *genuinely responsible* to the past, not merely exercising its interpretive authority over it—which is the Unchecked Retrospective Authority Challenge above.

Here the key is to pick out *technological progress* as essentially *prospectively* assessable: Aristotle could tell that we are *much* better than the folks of his time at moving people and heavy things quickly and for great distances, that we can demolish things (make big holes in the ground) and build big things that his folks could not. The story of the Arabs preserving Greek literature because of the *medical* technology

in this sense of Greeks—the fact that they could nurse warriors through battlefield wounds that the Arabs *knew* were otherwise fatal—is central here.

The technological constraint on self-serving retrospective theoretical self-congratulation is the demands of keeping the machines running, and not regressing along these prospectively assessable dimensions.

I think a story along these lines is colorable.

It encourages us to define a notion of technology functionally, in terms of its proper prospective constraint (the authority of its attitudes of assessment-attribution) on future assessments of theories (compare the case of judges).

But on the face of it, this approach does not seem available for concepts that are not empirical in the narrowest sense, such as law and legal concepts, which are surely not in Sellars’s “world in the narrow sense of the term.” Perhaps this is wrong. It is worth asking what plays the most analogous role in legal reasoning.

So it is worth looking for something beyond this potentially satisfying appeal to ‘technology’ as by definition addressing some prospectively assessable assessments.

That is what the idea of recollective rationality addresses.

c) **Recollective Rationality:**

II. Historical Dimension

1. Hegel on distinction between traditional/modern megastructures of normativity;
 - a) *Traditional* appreciates the *status-dependence of normative attitudes*.
 - b) *Modern* appreciates the *attitude-dependence of normative statuses*.

Both of these are one-sided. We need to be able to appreciate *both*.

2. *Diachronic* structure of *recognition*, for case of judges. (Judges chain novel text.)

3. Recollective rationality, giving reasons in the form of a rehearsal of the lessons of old commitments. Rationalizing by offering a retrospective rational reconstruction. Describing an *expressively progressive* trajectory through precedential antecedent commitments-entitlements.

4. **Two notions of determinateness: Kantian-Fregean and Hegelian.**

5. Understanding “expressively progressive” in terms of explicitation paths. Rejiggering the reason relations to make it possible to reconstruct an explicitation path to the present.

Hegel's answer (in terms of balancing normative attitudes and normative statuses, so as to reconcile traditional and modern insights into the status-dependence of normative attitudes, in the context of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses:

Diachronic authority structure of reciprocal recognition, as in the model of judges at common-or-case law. Here the authority of present judges over past judges (choosing precedents, filling in reason relations by picking from among the many sets compatible with previous decisions) is balanced by the authority of past judges, as administered and adjudicated by *future* judges. The future judges treat present decisions as authoritative (precedentially) just in case they have been appropriate *justified* by the present deciding judge offering a *rationale*, which shows that it was authorized by and is responsible to previous decisions. Such *rationales* take the form of discerning an *expressively progressive* trajectory of decisions from some initial starting-point in the past decisions. "Expressively progressive" here means that the trajectory identified by the deciding judge is intelligible as the gradual emergence into the daylight of explicitness of norms that become retrospectively visible as having been *implicit* all along in the decisions of prior judges.

The punchline of this line of thought is my suggestion as to how to make operational sense of this characterization of "expressively progressive" and hence rationalizing (legitimizing) rational recollections of trajectories through the past (that is, histories): in terms of recollection construed as offering one of the number of sets of reason relations that are broadly compatible with earlier decisions as a rationale for the current decision (as correct in terms of norms implicit in the prior decisions being highlighted), and vindicating it by exhibiting an *explicitation path* using those reason relations from some prior agreed-upon-as-precedential decision to the current decision.

Further Notes for Parts I and II:

Two punchlines:

(I): normative/alethic

(II): Modeling recollection on a) rejiggering reason relations so as to b) exhibit an explicitation path from some earlier point in the past to the currently endorsed view.

Fine just stipulates a relation between propositions (pairs of sets of states meeting Exclusivity) and sentences, in which the proposition consists of the truthmakers and falsity-makers of the sentences.

But i) What does that even mean? and

ii) How does it come about? (By magic?)

Really both (I) and (II) are responsive to this question: from formal semantics to philosophical semantics, where the latter requires a pragmatics to establish the relations appealed to and reconstructed in formal semantics.

Re (I):

Tell the Kantian (out of Hegel) story of representation as an essentially *normative* phenomenon. To be represented is to exercise a certain kind of *authority* over what count as *representings* of it just in virtue of being *responsible* for their *correctness* to how it with what thereby counts as represented.

It is this *normative* sense of ‘represents’ that we examined the *social*-perspectival articulation of last time, in terms of the representational locutions of natural language being those used to form *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitude, which in turn are understood as expressing distinctions of *social perspective* between the context of *assessment* and the context of *deliberation*, that is, between *attribution* and *acknowledgement* of commitments (to accept/reject).

That is, indeed, a crucial part of the story.

But it is not the *whole* story.

For the question of how the Hlobil isomorphism is (approximately) brought about and maintained. This is one version of the question asked above about Fine’s story.

And it is here that the alethic modal dimension of subjunctive dependence, that is subjunctively robust correlation, comes in. That is the modal dimension.

But we already have a place for that, in the *ranges of subjunctive robustness* of reason relations, which are their intensions. Here the inferentialist account of modality as connected to defeasibility of implications/incompatibilities comes in. (Our structure-explicitating ‘box’ marking persistence of reason relations.)

Tell the toy acid* story at the end of subjunctive tracking.

Now we want to say something about the process whereby subjunctive tracking and relatively isomorphic normative governance relations are instituted.

That is the historical story.

Also at end of (I) on empirical dimension of conceptual content:

Raise Sellarsian question of whether *metalinguistic* vocabularies can be normatively governed by and subjunctively sensitive to what they let us talk about, the features of vocabularies they make explicit.

The answer is ‘Yes’.

But we still can make something of Sellars’s bold metaphysical view that what they talk about (universals, propositions, modal properties) are “not in the world, in the narrow sense,” by distinguishing causal chains of reliably covarying events, and the RDRDs they constitute, that do *not*, from those that *do*, necessarily include linguistic items, i.e. utterings. If they do, they can be said not to be “in the world” in Sellars’s nominalistic “narrow sense.”

I. Empirical Dimension

1. Subjunctive dependence and normative governance.
2. Alethic and Deontic aspects.

II. Historical Dimension

6. Diachronic structure of recognition, for case of judges. (Judges chain novel text.)
7. Recollective rationality, giving reasons in the form of a rehearsal of the lessons of old commitments. Rationalizing by offering a retrospective rational reconstruction. Describing an *expressively progressive* trajectory through precedential antecedent commitments-entitlements.
8. **Two notions of determinateness: Kantian-Fregean and Hegelian.**
9. Understanding “expressively progressive” in terms of explicitation paths. Rejiggering the reason relations to make it possible to reconstruct an explicitation path to the present.

Might start with toy acid* story, from Sellars.

It indicates how reason relations/conceptual contents can *develop*, and become *better*.

That is, there is a *progressive* assessment put in play. Some developments are *better* than others.

Can then investigate:

- i) First, empirical dimension,
- ii) Then, historical dimension.

This order because empirical is more easily seen as important, and I have more to say about it. Historical will give us the internal notion of progress, Hlobil isomorphism gives us external notion of progress.

For (I): The Empirical Dimension of Concept-Use, construed in pragmatic terms:

(From 2023):

I. Description and Fact-Stating:

- a) Declarativism. Fact-stating in weakest sense, compatible with global expressivism. Normative facts as describing results of prescriptions.
- b) Proposal: First Dimension. Normative governance of describing by described (fact-stating by fact). Anscombe's two directions of normative 'fit'.
- c) The model of observation: also need RDRDs.
- d) Proposal: Second Dimension. Subjunctive tracking of described by describing.

II. Descriptive Dimensions of Metalinguistic Locutions:

- a) Can metalinguistic expressions be empirical descriptions?
- b) On two-ply account, can make observational use of many expressions Sellars analyzes as 'covertly metalinguistic.'
- c) A second bifurcation problem: distinguishing metalinguistic empirical descriptions.
- d) Proposal: Distinguish narrow/broad empirical descriptions by whether subjunctive tracking is necessarily mediated by linguistic representings.
- e) Some applications: pure (ungrounded) vs. mixed (grounded) abstractions.
- f) Does alethic modal vocabulary have empirical descriptive uses in the narrow sense?
- g) Conclusion: Metalinguistic pragmatics is compatible with two-dimensional empirical descriptive pragmatics supporting a representational semantics.

l) Description and Fact-Stating:

- a) Declarativism. Fact-stating in weakest sense, compatible with global expressivism. Normative facts as describing results of prescriptions.
- b) Proposal: First Dimension. Normative governance of describing by described (fact-stating by fact). Anscombe's two directions of normative 'fit'.
- c) The model of observation: also need RDRDs.
- d) Proposal: Second Dimension. Subjunctive tracking of described by describing.

Overall Lesson

Background:

I will distinguish 4 nested classes of expression-uses, corresponding to the diagram below.

They are four different ways of understanding '**fact-stating**', '**descriptive**', or '**representational**' uses.

(Of course one need not take this trio as picking out the same uses. There are good reasons to distinguish them. But for the purposes of my argument, it is worth considering them together, since the dialectic is the same, and people taking up positions w/res to one or another of these accordingly often make the same arguments.)

The most capacious identifies fact-stating (etc.) with the use of *declarative* sentences: the sentences whose free-standing utterance has the default pragmatic significance of *asserting*, *stating*, the making of *claims*.

The most restrictive identifies fact-stating (etc.) with *empirical descriptions* in a *narrow* sense.

These are empirical descriptions of what Sellars calls "the world in the *narrow* sense".

In between are *descriptions* generally, and more specifically, *empirical* descriptions.

So the divisions are:

1. Declarative-assertional uses,
2. Descriptive uses,
3. Empirical descriptive uses,
4. Empirical descriptive uses in the narrow, relatively discourse-independent sense.

The eventual story will have this form:

Nested Kinds of Use	Contrasts with	Defined by
Declaratives Most General Fact-Stating	Imperatives, Interrogatives	'Situation in space of implications' Assertible. Can be premises and conclusions of inferences Embeddable in conditionals and negations Truth-Evaluable
Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Prescriptions	Normative direction of fit is word to world
Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Fictional Descriptions	1) Normative governance of describings by describeds 2) Subjunctive tracking of describeds by describings
Narrowly Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Broadly Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Subjunctive tracking not necessarily mediated by tokenings of linguistic expressions

Claims:

- '*Descriptivism*', against which Sellars warns us (in CDCM), and what I shall call '*declarativism*' are twin errors with a common root.
- Both stem from ignoring the distinctions among declaratives, descriptions, empirical descriptions, and narrowly empirical descriptions.
- *Descriptivism* assimilates everything to the most restrictive understanding of descriptions (or perhaps to one of the broader ones), while *declarativism* refuses to make any distinctions of kind.
- The typical dialectic is to appreciate the difficulties of one of these extreme positions and to respond by recoiling to the other.
So, seeing what is wrong with a more restrictive descriptivism, some philosophers recoil to full-blown declarativism. Huw Price originally followed Rorty (and in some ways Geach) on this path.
Or, seeing what is wrong with declarativism, some philosophers recoil to too narrow a form of descriptivism. Most traditional model-theoretic semantics, possible worlds semantics, and truthmaker semantics is at least implicitly embedded in a pragmatics of this sort.

The *Tractatus* is the purest form of narrow descriptivism, and the later Wittgenstein admirably recants not by recoiling to declarativism but by pointing out important distinctions. His overreaction (I think) is rather to throwing up his hands and giving up on the project of theoretically systematizing those distinctions in any. When he warns us against assuming that because the surface grammar of some potentially problematic locutions (say, first-person pain avowals) is that of declarative sentences that their use should be understood as fact-stating in any narrow sense, he does *not* go on to tell us how to understand any such narrower senses of ‘fact-stating’.

1. (a) Declarativism, and its associated problematic: metaphysical extravagance or bifurcation.
 - a. Declarativism about *descriptive*, *fact-stating*, and *representational* uses (of course one might distinguish these in various ways) is the view that these uses coincide with the use of declarative sentences.
 - b. Declarative sentences are the sentences:
 - i. Whose free-standing uses have the default significance of *assertions* or *claimings*, expressing *beliefs* or *doxastic commitments*.
Cf. the “iron triangle of discursiveness”, connecting
 - Declarative sentences on the *syntactic* side,
 - Asserting on the *pragmatic* side, and
 - Truth-evaluability on the *semantic* side.
 - ii. Which *embed*, paradigmatically in negations and as the antecedents of conditionals, but also in propositional attitude-ascribing locutions such as “...believes that __”, “...intends that __” and “...desires that __”.
 - c. The most straightforward response to the Frege-Geach embedding objection to force-expressivism about various locutions, paradigmatically normative vocabulary, is declarativism: Acknowledge as descriptive, fact-stating, or proposition-expressing all uses of declarative sentences.
The two features (i) and (ii) above do seem to go with *truth-evaluability* in its most general sense.

When Sellars introduces the distinction between labeling and describing
He really offers sufficient conditions on ‘description’ only in the declarativist sense of *assertible*.

The Sellarsian way of distinguishing ‘describing’ from ‘labeling’, by ‘situation in a space of implications’ picks out describing only in a very general, unbifurcated sense. It is sufficient for this, but only necessary for the less extensive notion of description I’ll define.

A key point here is that **insisting on “location in a space of implications” is *not* sufficient, by Sellars’s own lights, for being ‘descriptive’ in the sense in which, according to the *scientia mensura*, (natural) science is authoritative in the “dimension of describing and explaining”.** **w/res to that, this condition is necessary, but not sufficient.**

So we need to ask: what else is required (what are sufficient conditions for) being ‘descriptive’ in the sense in which the *scientia mensura* accords authority to (natural) science?

I will claim that it is *empirical* descriptions in the *narrow* sense.

That is, one needs *two more* distinctions (‘bifurcations’) *beyond* that needed to distinguish (a *very* extensive notion of) ‘description’ from mere labeling.

The “space of implications”, which Sellars uses to distinguish describing from mere labeling (classifying as mere differential responsiveness) which basically *is* the subjunctive tracking condition (not all labeling is in presence, or is a kind of report-label, so talk of labeling corresponds to the non-observational side of describing) is the criterion of *declarative sentencehood*. For it is the condition of concept-use, conceptual contentfulness, on the semantic side, and the speech act of *assertion*.

Being the space of implications in this sense is what confers conceptual content, on Sellars’s inferentialist understanding of conceptual content. And it is that content that contributes to the conceptual content of sentences in which it is embedded—paradigmatically, as the antecedent of a conditional, or something that can be negated (the contexts of embedding Geach focuses on in his two articles).

The declarative genus is what is assertible-claimable, which is what is in the first instance conceptually contentful, because inferentially articulated.

2. *Pros* and *cons* of declarativism:

- a) Pro: The most straightforward response to the Frege-Geach embedding objection to force-expressivism about various locutions, paradigmatically normative vocabulary, is declarativism: Acknowledge as descriptive, fact-stating, proposition-expressing, or representational all uses of declarative sentences.
- b) Pro (pulling in the opposite, antirepresentationalist direction): This deflated use avoids what Huw Price calls the “bifurcation problem”: drawing a line between a narrower class of genuinely descriptive, fact-stating, truth-evaluable, or representational and a wider class of expressions that are only misleadingly thought of this way.

(I am on my way to a proposal as to how to make just such a ‘bifurcation’.)

- c) Pro: All declarative uses not only embed, they also are *truth-evaluable*.
Deflationary accounts of ‘true’, such as the prosentential one (which I take to be the most sophisticated and satisfactory), but others such as Paul Horwich’s, which take Tarski’s T-sentences to give us the essence of the use of ‘true’, support declarativism *about truth-evaluability*.

This consideration is an important part of Huw Price’s case for global expressivism.

- d) Con: One must admit a vast and motley range of kinds of facts:
Not just culinary and nautical facts, but negative and conditional facts, probabilistic facts, modal facts, semantic facts, intentional and psychological facts, aesthetic facts, mathematical facts, and normative and moral facts.

A uniform semantic and pragmatic account is being bought at the price of metaphysical extravagance: the need to make sense of a plethora of wildly different kinds of facts and states of affairs.

If, in a *Tractarian descriptivist* spirit, one is tempted to think of facts as arrangements of objects, or as particulars standing in relations to one another, the difficulty of making sense in these terms of such exotica as normative facts—the way particulars have to be related in which the fact that S *ought* to perform action A consists—exerts substantial pressure for a recoil back to some sort of bifurcation, requiring quite different accounts of the semantics of large and important classes of declarative sentences.

Combining declarativism with a narrowly descriptivist or representational model of fact-stating is a recipe for disaster.

As Rorty points out, there are real troubles trying to use the semantic model that makes good sense for

The frog is on the log,

to make sense of the content of declarative sentences such as

Justice is a virtue,

Romanticism over-reacted against the Enlightenment,

Cezanne taught us to see surfaces differently,

and

Sellars was a deeper thinker than Quine.

- e) A lot of Anglophone philosophy of the twentieth century can be understood as consisting of attempts to navigate this problematic:

the choice between *promiscuous representationalism* and *semantic bifurcation*.

Rorty’s and Price’s global antirepresentationalism, as something like declarativism plus expressivism, is one program for responding to the difficulties with bifurcationist representationalism and its carving out a notion of “facts (the world) in the narrow sense.”

- f) Note that if one does accept the need for some bifurcation—as Sellars clearly does—one need not take an *invidious* attitude towards what is expressed by sentences that are *not* classified as being ‘descriptive in the narrow sense.’

That is, rejecting *declarativism* need not commit one to ‘*descriptivism*’ in Sellars’s sense, as he urges when he says:

[O]nce the tautology ‘The world is described by descriptive concepts’ is freed from the idea that the business of all non-logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an *ungrudging* recognition that many expressions which empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in discourse are not *inferior*, just *different*. [CDCM §79]

3. Sellars himself, in this passage, and in the protasis to the *scientia mensura*, which restricts the sovereign authority of natural science to the “the dimension of describing and explaining the world,” is committed to a bifurcationist approach.
- a) Independently of his nominalist commitment to a world consisting of particulars or absolute processes, he is committed to the notion of the world “in the narrow sense,” the world as *described by* eventual natural science.
- b) But what does he mean by ‘description’ or descriptive uses of expressions?

He never squarely addresses this issue.

- c) Note that in this regard, he is far from alone, even among the greats.

The later Wittgenstein, too, warns us against descriptivism, in the sense of rejecting the idea that all declarative sentences are to be understood on the descriptive model applicable to ‘The frog is on the log.’ But, like Sellars, he never tells us how he understands that model.

Perhaps they both thought that it was enough to point to the *Tractatus*, as the purest distillation of that sort of descriptivism.

Proposal: First Dimension.

Normative governance of describing by described (fact-stating by fact). Anscombe’s two directions of normative ‘fit’.

4. But I think we are in a position to do better.

I want to propose a two-dimensional account, generalized from the two-ply account of observation that I find in *EPM*.

That two-ply account distinguishes a normative conceptual component from a modal RDRD component. The latter distinguishes specifically *observational* uses of concepts from other uses, since *all* concept use is for Sellars a normative affair of implicit practical proprieties governing language-language moves, as well as language-entry and language-exit transitions (SRLG).

Proposal: First Dimension.

Normative governance of describing by described

(fact-stating by fact).

Anscombe's two directions of normative 'fit'.

Descriptive uses distinguished from *prescriptive* uses by normative direction of fit.

Anscombe's story of the two lists:

- **The shopper's list is authoritative for, in the sense of providing the standard for assessments of correctness of items in the cart.**
- **The items in the cart are authoritative for, in the sense of providing the standard for assessments of the correctness of the detective's list.**

This shows us the essential difference of *normative direction of fit* between

- **the *prescriptive* pragmatic significance of the shopper's list and**
- **the *descriptive* pragmatic significance of the detective's list.**

Not all prescriptive uses are declarative.

"Clean up your room!" and "Let go of me!" are not.

But some uses with prescriptive force are declarative.

"You should clean up your room," and "You should let go of me," are both declarative and prescriptive.

Note: Some describings have prescriptive consequences:

"The light is red. So, you should stop."

What it prescribes is just what it *says*, indeed, *describes* ("If the lights are off, the door should be shut.")

The difference between describing the state of affairs ("The lights are off and the door is shut,") and prescribing it (marked by the 'should') is precisely the direction of fit of *both* normative governance *and* subjunctive tracking.

In the prescription, the actual state of affairs tracks and is normatively governed by the saying.

In the description, the saying tracks and is normatively governed by the actual state of affairs.

Note that descriptive/prescriptive are just the two *basic* directions of normative fit.

Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) cycles are describe-prescribe-describe-exit cycles, with conditional branched-schedule algorithms at their heart.

It follows that

Requiring the descriptive direction of normative fit carves out a proper subclass of declaratives.

5. The model of observation: *Empirical* descriptions also need RDRDs—in addition to the word-to-world direction of normative fit.

a) ***Empirical* Description (describing, descriptive use of expressions) has both a semantic dimension and an epistemic dimension.**

Semantic:

Specifying a world-word direction of normative fit—what we can now call a *descriptive* direction of fit, addresses the *semantic* dimension. For it says that what one describes or represents, the fact one states, serves as the standard of assessment for the *correctness* of the describing, in a distinctive, semantic sense of ‘correct’. (There are other, nonsemantic dimensions of assessment: of rudeness or social propriety, conversational aptness....)

If we like, we can say that these are *truth* assessments—hence the rubric ‘semantic’.

We can also think of the standard of assessments of semantic correctness as specifying what one is *committing* oneself to (how one is committing oneself to things being) by using a description (stating a fact).

But for specifically *empirical* descriptions, there is a further dimension:

Epistemic:

But there is also a question of something like *justification*, corresponding to the issue of *entitlement* to one’s descriptive commitment.

This is an issue of something like how describers are sufficiently “in touch” with what they are describing that there is any point in holding them responsible for the correctness of their descriptive claims.

This second dimension is characteristic of a proper subclass of descriptions: specifically *empirical* descriptions.

These are descriptions subject to a special kind of epistemic-justificatory assessment of one’s entitlement to the description.

Empirical descriptions are the home language-game of describing.

Non-empirical descriptions are an *essentially parasitic* and in some ways *degenerate* suburb of this downtown area.

One principal species of this genus of nonempirical descriptive uses is in *fiction*.

Though writing fiction involves aspects of intentional agency that need not be involved in all claiming or describing, it would be a mistake to understand it as having a purely world-to-word direction of fit in the sense in which true prescriptives do.

What fiction principally lacks is the second, epistemic dimension of empirical description: *subjunctive tracking* of what is described by describings of it.

Note that in focusing on this special case of empirical description, I am in effect re-writing the *scientia mensura*, to make explicit what I take to be implicit in it:

“In the dimension of *empirical* describing and explaining the *material* world (“*the world in the narrow sense*”), *natural* science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not.” [EPM §41, revised]

(I would further amend “that it is” to “that *and how* it is,” but that is a different issue.)

- b) A good way to think about the central special case of *empirical* descriptions is to look to a paradigm.

And **the core of empirical describing is *noninferential reporting*: “The traffic light is red.”**

After all, it is the relation of descriptions to noninferential reports that makes them *empirical* descriptions—though we must be careful not to understand this relation on too simple a model.

Now it would be *too* restrictive to limit description to noninferential reporting.

Physicists can describe happenings in the first two minutes of the universe and interactions of quarks in a proton that we have not observed.

Strategy:

But we can look to the structure of species of paradigmatically descriptive noninferential reports for clues to the nature of the wider genus of empirical description.

On the two-ply model of observational uses of concepts that I have argued Sellars introduces in *EPM*, while all concept use is implicitly *normative*, and Sellars has explicitly argued that “being situated in a space of implications” is a *necessary* condition for *describing* (rather than merely labeling), observational uses of concepts require also elicitation of tokenings by the exercise of reliable differential responsive dispositions: RDRDs.

We can generalize that by seeing it as an instance of the systematic subjunctive dependence of representings on representeds—in the paradigmatic case, of observings on observeds.

This is to say that *if* what is described *were* (or *had been*) different, the describing *would be* (or *would have been*) different.

6. **So I am proposing (on Sellars’s behalf) a model of *empirical descriptive uses*, modelled on his two-ply account of *observational uses*, as essentially requiring two dimensions of dependence of describings on what is described:**

- i. ***Normative semantic governance of representings by representeds*, in that what is represented serves as the standard for assessments of the correctness of empirical descriptive representings *as* representings of those representeds, and**

- ii. ***Subjunctive epistemic tracking of representeds by representings, in that (under the right conditions—compare “standard conditions for observation”) if the representeds were (or had been) different, the empirical descriptive representings would be (or would have been) correspondingly different. “Correspondingly” is the analogue of the reliability condition on the RDRDs (reliable differential responsive dispositions) in observational uses.***

The first condition, of semantic governance, will be specified using *deontic normative* vocabulary of ‘correctness’ of describings and ‘authority’ (of described over describing) and ‘responsibility’ (of describing to described).

The second condition, of epistemic tracking, will be specified using *alethic modal* vocabulary of subjunctive conditionals codifying the matter-of-factual dependence of describings on described, via causal chains of reliably covarying events linking described to describings.

The whole discussion should be understood as taking place in a *pragmatic metavocabulary*, since what is being specified is a distinctive kind of *use* expressions can have, namely *empirical descriptive* uses. Insofar as some expression-kinds have these uses as their core, characteristic uses, we can also talk about ‘empirical descriptive vocabulary’. That classification will still be part of a *pragmatic* metavocabulary.

7. On this account *observational* uses count as empirically descriptive.

But so do many applications of *theoretical* terms. Recall that these are for Sellars (we can now say) *empirical descriptive* uses that are *not* observational *noninferential* reports, because (at this stage in inquiry) the theoretical terms have only *inferential* circumstances of application.

Nonetheless, the theoretical claims can still count as empirically descriptive, for they are not only normatively semantically governed by the worldly items they describe, but can subjunctively track them. The condition on the existence of such tracking relations is that the inferences that articulate the conceptual contents of the theoretical terms must be *good* inferences. That is, if the space of subjunctively robust implications that articulates the contents of the theoretical concepts A and B permits the inference from ‘x is an A’ to ‘x is a B’, it must be the case that if anything *were* an A then it *would be* a B, if ‘A’-talk and ‘B’-talk is to epistemically track (and so, empirically describe) As and Bs.

Recall that Sellars emphasizes in *EPM* that the distinction between objects and states of affairs that our empirical access to is observational and those that our empirical access to is inferential, that is observable and theoretical objects and states of affairs, are not to be understood as *ontologically* distinct. They are only *epistemologically* or *methodologically* distinct.

He argues for this by pointing out that things routinely cross the line from theoretical to observable. Insofar as our theories are good ones, that is, insofar as the implications that articulate the conceptual contents expressed by those theoretical terms are good ones, the theoretical objects are real empirical objects. As such, they cannot be *necessarily* unobservable.

They must be only *contingently* so, because we are unable to situate ourselves in standard conditions for observing them.

We can now see that this means that the subjunctive dependence of empirical descriptive representations on empirically described representeds can be inferentially mediated as well as a matter of noninferential RDRDs.

8. So, in putting forward this two-dimensional account of what distinguishes *empirical descriptive uses* of linguistic expressions from nondescriptive or nonempirical descriptive ones, I am just applying and extending metaconceptual raw materials Sellars has put on the table.

This is meant to be a more careful definition of what I have talked about as

‘OED’ vocabulary: ordinary, empirical, descriptive vocabulary.

I am claiming that this double-barreled criterion of normative semantic governance and epistemic subjunctive tracking solves Sellars’s ‘*bifurcation problem*’.

- a) It is the natural extension of his two-ply account of noninferential reports and his understanding of the relations between *theoretical* empirical concepts and those that, in addition to the roles they play in a space of subjunctively robust implications, have *noninferential*, observational uses.
- b) It cuts at the proper joints for his globally *antidescriptivist* stance, in which it is situated.
- c) And it is at least a good first step in the direction of the generic restrictions on the *scientia mensura* assignment of authority to natural science over a class of claims (though we’ll see we need something still more to get this right).

9. Treating this two-dimensional deontic/alethic criterion of demarcation of a narrower-than-declarativist domain of empirical descriptive uses of linguistic expressions as a working hypothesis, I want to explore the consequences of applying it to Sellars’s distinction between the world or reality in a *narrow* sense and the world in the *wider* sense that includes discursive practices and their products.


I want to bring this normative-governance plus subjunctive-tracking model of empirical descriptive uses into contact with Sellars’s *positive metalinguistic metaphysics* for the whole variety of expressions I retailed earlier: the products of various kinds of nominalization, including introducing terms by abstraction.

In particular I want to ask, does the distinction between the world in the narrow sense and the world in the wider sense *coincide with* the distinction between what can correctly be empirically described and what cannot?

We have seen that the wide/narrow distinction on the side of reality has at least three dimensions:

- i. Descriptive-explanatory (we know that for Sellars “the explanatory and the descriptive resources of the language advance hand in hand”—CDCM),
- ii. the authority of natural science, according to the *scientia mensura*, and

iii. independence of discursive activity—which is what disqualifies essentially metalinguistic expressions from being descriptive of the world in the narrow sense. Although the *scientia mensura* slogan seems to line up the privileging of natural science with empirical description, I want to argue that better understanding of Sellars’s view would have it that the narrow/wide distinction is a distinction *within* what is empirically describable. The picture as I see it is accordingly this one:



I have hatched the area labeled “Non-empirical Descriptions” to indicate that the label only applies to what is *outside* the “Wide Empirical Descriptions” oval.

It probably would have been better to just use ‘Descriptions’, and emphasize the nesting.

I turn to that argument about what is needed to count as describing the world in the narrow sense.

It is not enough just to require that what is described is not itself linguistic.

II) Descriptive Dimensions of Metalinguistic Locutions:

- a) Can metalinguistic expressions be empirical descriptions?
- b) On two-ply account, can make observational use of many expressions Sellars analyzes as ‘covertly metalinguistic.’
- c) A second bifurcation problem: distinguishing metalinguistic empirical descriptions.
- d) Proposal: Distinguish narrow/broad empirical descriptions by whether subjunctive tracking is necessarily mediated by linguistic representings.
- e) Some applications: pure (ungrounded) vs. mixed (grounded) abstractions.
- f) Does alethic modal vocabulary have empirical descriptive uses in the narrow sense?
- g) Conclusion: Metalinguistic pragmatics is compatible with two-dimensional empirical descriptive pragmatics supporting a representational semantics.

1. Q1: Can metalinguistic expressions have empirical descriptive uses?

A: Sure. Pragmatic metavocabularies can empirically describe the use of linguistic expressions. Now some aspects of that use are essentially normative, and one might think (Sellars does think) that normative vocabulary is *not* empirically descriptive, because it is at base prescriptive. But what S calls ‘sign-designs’ or ‘natural linguistic objects’ can be empirically described—as they must be for picturing relations involving them to be defined. And because “norms induce regularities” there are regularities that can be empirically described. Metalinguistic descriptions of those sign-designs and regularities involving them can both normatively govern the correctness of those describings, and can be epistemically tracked by them.

2. Q2: What about the kind of expressions that Sellars analyzes as ‘*covertly metalinguistic*’?

Can *they* have empirical descriptive uses?

On the account I have offered what is *observable* is *a fortiori empirically describable*.

Observability—what one can *see* to be the case—is the hallmark of paradigmatic cases of empirical description/fact-stating.

We have seen that S understands *theoretical* entities and states of affairs to be *in principle* observable. That is why there is no ontological, but only an epistemological difference between observable/theoretical concepts and claims.

Claim:

Many of the expressions S analyzes as covertly metalinguistic have observational uses, according to his (admittedly unusually capacious) two-ply characterization of noninferentially elicited observation reports.

- a) We can use the right kind of *fact-stating sentences* observationally, since I can *see that*, for instance, the light has turned red or the frog is on the log.

- b) I can noninferentially report the presence of *properties* (red, square, heavy, tall...) and *relations* (between, on top of, behind...).
- c) *Kinds*: I can see the dog, and dogs.
- d) Events: can see the branch breaking, the dancing of the ballerina...
- e) And as I argued when I introduced the two-ply account of observation, under the right circumstances I can hear not just the noise you made, but what you *said*: the *meaning* you expressed—in the same sense in which I can on this account *literally* see previously theoretical entities such as mu-mesons, with the right instruments. I am hearing it and not seeing it because if you cover my ears, I can't hear the meanings any more, as I can't see them in your note if you cover my eyes.
- f) Similarly, under the right circumstances—and if I am properly brought up, I can see some normative states of affairs: the cruelty of a blow, the bravery of an act.
As with meanings, there need not be *secondary qualities* perceived as part of these observations—though they might show up in the causal chain of reliably covarying events that underlies the RDRDs I am exercising.
Indeed, the idea of *Gibsonian affordances* is that the *most primitive*—certainly prelinguistic—form of perception *is* perception of *proprieties* and *possibilities*. For affordances are normative and modal: what role something *could* play, or what it *would be good* for in the lived life of the animal. Paradigmatic affordances are 'good place to hide', 'good to eat'...
Can *also* describe **affordances** (thought of as primitive normative states of affairs), although they are a kind of practical propriety—worth thinking about because they are plausibly the *primitive* form of normative states of affairs. And affordances *are* response-dependent properties as well as normative properties. They are states of affairs that are *appropriately* responded to in a particular way.
- g) Abstracta: At least some *numbers* can be visible. I can see that there are *three* apples.

Conclusion:

Both the normative governance *and* the subjunctive tracking conditions that I have suggested we treat as individually necessary and jointly sufficient for empirical descriptive uses of expressions can be satisfied for many of the locutions Sellars argues are essentially metalinguistic.

3. So should we conclude that metalinguistic expressions are empirically descriptive in the same sense that sentences such as “The frog is on the log,” are?

Here is *another* ‘bifurcation problem.’

Sellars needs to distinguish the sense in which these metalinguistic expressions are empirically descriptive from the sense in which his paradigmatic cases are, on pain of losing the ‘world in the narrow sense’ vs. ‘world in the broad sense’ distinction.

He cannot use *this* notion of empirical description to distinguish first-class ontological status.

And here, too, we can turn to Sellars's own arguments to find what we need. Here we can take our cue from the SRLG way of distinguishing *rule-governedness* from mere *regularity* (with pattern-governedness in the middle, as showing how rule-governedness can emerge).

There Sellars argued that the important issue is whether *representations* (representings) of rules play an essential role in the regularity being as it is, that is, in the *subjunctively reliable covariance* of what is done on what the rule prescribes.

This was explicitly put forward as his version of Kant's distinction between acting *according to rules*, that is regularly, as everything in nature does, and acting according to *conceptions* (Kant's word is 'Vorstellungen', representations) of rules.

This *causal* dependence of representeds on *representings* is a sensible criterion of *not* being in 'the world in the narrow sense', which excludes features that are *reference-dependent* (not sense-dependent) on discursive practices.

Definition:

So I propose that we distinguish empirical descriptions in a *narrow* sense from empirical descriptions in a *broad* sense.

Empirical descriptions in the *narrow* sense are those where the epistemic subjunctive tracking relation does *not essentially or necessarily depend*, anywhere along the chain of reliably covarying events connecting represented to empirical descriptive representings, upon linguistic representings.

Some observations:

- Of course, *all* concept-use essentially involves the linguistic representings that are finally applied. It is depending essentially on *mediating* linguistic representings that is forbidden for the narrow class of empirical descriptive uses.
- Objection: The very case you call upon to justify your definition of narrow descriptions, as not involving reliance on representings, undercuts the distinction. For SRLG says that *all* concept use depends on representations of rules, on the part of the teachers.

Response: True. But that is not the kind of reliance on representings that is invoked in my definition. For that definition specifically looks to the subjunctive tracking relation, and asks whether *that*, once established, relies on or depends upon (the causal chain of reliably covariant events includes) representings. And that is not at all what the general reliance of rule-governedness (SRLG) on representings of rules by teachers enforces.

- Theoretical terms have only inferential circumstances of application. The premises of those inferences are, by definition of 'premises', linguistic expressions (representings).

But, as our discussion of the class of theoretical entities as not ontologically, but only epistemologically distinct from observable ones emphasized, Sellars's views about the shiftability of the boundary between them entails that no theoretical object or fact is *essentially unobservable*. Its unobservability by us now is *always* a contingent matter about our relations to it. So such terms are not *necessarily* only applicable inferentially—that is, in a way that involves other linguistic representings.

Some applications:

Applied to **abstraction**, the account makes a crucial distinction. This distinction is perhaps the best fruit of the account, and a major justification-rationale for adopting it.

For it militates against counting statements of *pure* set theory (based entirely on \emptyset , so having no urelements) as fact-stating in a narrow sense.

Consider: All descriptions involve a linguistic component, on the side of the representings that subjunctively track and are normatively governed by what is represented-described.

I can, I think, subjunctively track pure sets.

But I can *only* do that in a way that *essentially* and *unavoidably* requires linguistic expressions *in the chain of reliably covarying events* that makes up the tracking RDRD.

This is *not* so for visible or audible particulars, properties-relations, and facts (states of affairs = possible facts)—on the side of observation.

The thought is that it is fair enough to banish from “the world in the narrow sense”, the world as it would or could be if there were no discursive practices or practitioners, so no specifically *conceptual* appearances of it, anything the capacity so much as differentially to respond to (not yet *conceptually* respond, because *all* of those responses are only in “the world in the broader sense”) essentially depends on linguistic representations of it.

Some abstracta (=things our semantic access to is mediated by terms introduced by abstraction) do not require subjunctive tracking that goes through linguistic expressions. For suitable material objects, I can see how many apples there are (for some numbers and some presentations) in a noninferential way. I do not need to count them (which essentially uses numbers).

Now it is true that if I could not count, I could not see not only that the apples are red, but that there are three of them. But that is no more disqualifying of observability (and so descriptive fact-statingness) than the fact that I could not *see that they are red* unless I could use some **•red•**. (To think otherwise is to commit to the Myth of the Given.)

That a certain responsive ability, the capacity to master some RDRD and so the corresponding concept as observable (the secondary-quality version) depends on one's being able to use *other* concepts is not disqualifying.

The proposed criterion is that the chain of reliably covarying events that connects the concept-user to what it subjunctively tracks need not include linguistic expressions.

And the claim is that that is so for some uses of number, as well as for other observable properties, and can be so for other terms introduced by abstraction, **but is not true for discrimination of \emptyset , $\{\emptyset\}$, $\{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}\}$, and so on.**

- a) I have throughout queried S's nominalism by asking what the difference that makes a difference is between theoretical terms and claims, which can characterize reality in the narrow sense, and abstract terms and claims, which cannot.
Now we are in a position to formulate a convincing answer on S's behalf:
The most objectionable abstracta, pure sets, are *essentially* and *in principle* only accessible *inferentially*, that is, in a way that depends on linguistic representings (compare: representations of rules). Both the subjunctive tracking of *pure* abstracta by our claims and our claims' normative governance by them *essentially* and *unavoidably* depend on discursive representings used in inference. In this regard they are to be distinguished from theoretical entities.
- b) At this point might look at whether *properties*, *relations*, and *states of affairs* satisfy the criterion of eligibility for inclusion in the world in the narrow sense. Does *their* observability *essentially* depend on our representings of them, in order to understand either claims normative governance by or subjunctive tracking of them?
Not so long as we mean the use of the *predicates*. The question of the use of *nominalizations* of the predicates—the singular terms that refer to *properties* such as circularity and *relations* such as betweenness are another matter.
- c) It is plausible that *pure sets* are *in principle* only epistemically accessible to us with the mediation of representings of them. But this is *not* true of terms introduced by abstraction and claims about them in general. For if the equivalence relations and the representings picked out by the base vocabulary on the basis of which *abstracta* are introduced are themselves material or concrete (compare: sets with concrete ur-elements). Thus one can come to *see* that there are three apples, *noninferentially*, just as one can come to *see that* there is a mu-meson or Toltec potsherd.

In this sense, numerical properties can be in the world in the narrow sense.

Sellarsian raw materials drawn on here:

1. It is only because the expressions in terms of which we describe objects...locate these objects in a space of implications, that they describe at all, rather than merely label. [CDCM §108]
2. [O]nce the tautology 'The world is described by descriptive concepts' is freed from the idea that the business of all non-logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an *ungrudging* recognition that many expressions which empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in discourse are not *inferior*, just *different*. [CDCM §79]
3. Two-ply account of observation, from EPM.
4. Characterization of observable/theoretical distinction as epistemological rather than ontological.

5. Distinction between ‘the world in the narrow sense,’ and the world in the ‘broader’ sense that includes discursive practices.
6. S’s master-argument that essentially *metalinguistic* concepts do not specify items in the world in the narrow sense.
7. SRLG invocation of causal involvements of *representings* of a rule to distinguish the rule-governed from the merely regular.

Note that all of this is clarification needed *in advance of* the *scientia mensura* and the kind of scientific naturalism it expresses. For we need to understand the apodosis of the *scientia mensura*: “in the domain of describing and explaining” in order to understand the scope of the authority Sellars is assigning to natural science.

We also need it to understand Sellars’s *antidescriptivism* (from CDCM):

[O]nce the tautology ‘The world is described by descriptive concepts’ is freed from the idea that the business of all non-logical concepts is to describe, the way is clear to an *ungrudging* recognition that many expressions which empiricists have relegated to second-class citizenship in discourse are not *inferior*, just *different*. [CDCM §79]

8. It is important that **on the line I am pursuing, S can cheerfully acknowledge that predicates, sentences, locutions introduced by abstraction, and alethic modal expressions, also events and temporal relation-words are *descriptive* (have descriptive uses), while distinguishing between *metalinguistic* descriptions and statements of fact and *narrow* ones.** It is *that* distinction that I am suggesting be made by distinguishing, among descriptive uses that have both normative governance by and subjunctive tracking of the facts they state (so, the right word-to-world direction of fit), between those in which specifically the subjunctive tracking *essentially* depends upon (has as a necessary condition) the involvement of linguistic *representings*.

So there is a broad category of *descriptions*, which contrasts at least with prescriptions, and is less extensive than *declaratives*.

The paradigm (though not the only kind) of description is *empirical* description.

But it comes with two sub-classes: narrow and broad.

Any expressions whose *descriptive* use is *essentially* metalinguistic is only a *broad*, and not a narrow description.

But that is only one special case (important though it is to S) of ways conceptually structured *representings* can be essential to the subjunctively robust tracking of representeds by *representings* (understood as parallel, with the other homozygotic

9. I am offering this account of

- a) description or fact-stating, less capacious than declarativism, and
- b) distinguishing narrow from broad description by dependence of subjunctive tracking on conceptual *representings*

as the missing piece that connects the two halves of the original diagram: the left-wing and right-wing strands in Sellars.

This probably does not apply to *meaning* expressions. As functional classifiers, they are not only metalinguistic (so only in the broad world, or only broadly real), but also essentially *normative*. Sellars's semantics is not only a nonrelation matter of functional classification, but that classification is normative, in a sense that Sellars (probably) thinks of as involving *prescriptions*—either upstream, as for Hare, or downstream, as consequences of proprieties and other deontic normative locutions. If they are prescriptive, then they are not descriptive—not just not *empirically* descriptive.

Does alethic modal vocabulary have empirical descriptive uses in the narrow sense?

I want to close by arguing that according to these ways of understanding the terms, both facts (expressed by declarative sentences) and subjunctively robust relations of consequence and incompatibility exist in the world in the narrow sense, now read as the world as empirically describable in the narrow sense. (Since facts or states of affairs can be real in the narrow sense, so can properties and relations.)

- a) The punchline of Part II, on the descriptive dimension of metalinguistic expressions, and the transition to Part III, on bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism, is the treatment of alethic modality. I want to put this in quite a different box from *abstracta* (not just pure abstracta, but even mixed abstracta, where the underlying vocabulary abstracted from is empirical), and into a box that includes predicates and sentences. All these are part of using concepts at all.
- b) One way to put the point is that **what is expressed by alethic modal vocabulary is *no less essential to concept use as such than sentences***—and *so*, if one can make the case for singular terms, for predicates (both monadic, property-expressing, and polyadic, relation-expressing).
- c) By contrast, one can *talk* without using terms introduced by abstraction. Although, admittedly, one cannot talk about specifically *mathematical* objects, properties, relations, and facts without such terms. Indeed, if “introducing terms by abstraction” is considered in a sufficiently capacious way, where doing so by treating equivalence relations as identities is just *one*, paradigmatic such method, the essential dependence on expressions introduced by *generally* abstractive methods might be *definitional* of mathematics.
- d) For Sellars argued in CDCM (and, for (b), in his very writing that was published: “Concepts as Involving Laws, and Inconceivable without Them”) both
 - i. Description (rather than mere labeling) requires “situation in a space of implications,”
and

- ii. Kant-Sellars thesis about modality: the implications that articulate the contents of ordinary empirical descriptive (OED) vocabulary must be subjunctively robust implications (and incompatibilities).
 - e) This is enough to put what is expressed by alethic modal vocabulary (though not the use of that vocabulary itself) into a box with *sentences*, as a necessary part of concept *use*. And Sellars *cannot* maintain that any descriptive vocabulary that essentially involves linguistic expressions in its subjunctive tracking relations *in the sense in which what is subjunctively tracking is the use of linguistic expressions* carves out a proper subset of descriptions in general. *These* expressions are *not* metalinguistic—though of course one can have metalinguistic expressions *for* them.
 - f) So I want to claim that Sellars *overgeneralized* a *good* lesson from his analysis of expressions introduced by abstraction as *essentially* metalinguistic. Indeed, I am arguing that his conclusion that the semantic interpretants of such expressions should be excluded from inclusion in “the world in the narrow sense” already overgeneralizes that lesson. For the use of abstractions from *empirical* descriptions can have their own descriptive dimension.
 - g) What is true is that, like normative vocabulary, this descriptive dimension is *parasitic on* the *primary* expressive role of such expressions.
10. If all that is right, then I am looking at distinguishing:
- a) OED vocabulary, divided at any time into
 - i. Observational and
 - ii. Theoretical vocabulary
 - b) OED vocabulary
 - i. *must* include *sentences* (not just terms),
 - ii. and *if* it has *subsential* vocabulary, both terms (singular and sortal) *and* predicates as sentence-frames. As Jumblese shows, there need not be distinct expressions for these.
 - c) Alethic modal vocabulary.
 - d) Empirical abstractions. These include, but are not limited to:
 - i. Event talk.
 - e) Pure abstractions, paradigmatically in pure set-theory.
 - f) Normative vocabulary. It, too, has a descriptive dimension, but one that is parasitic on the primary expressive role of normative vocabulary, which is to make explicit commitment to the propriety of patterns of practical inference.
 - g) Meaning talk: normative-functional classification.
11. The overarching principle for distinguishing among expressions that have a descriptive use, in the sense of having *both* the right direction of normative fit *and* the right direction of subjunctive tracking—where representings are responsible to (dependent on) representeds *both*

normatively *and* alethically—is to look at the roles that norm-governed expressions (cf. meaning-statements as functional classifications) play in *both* dimensions of dependence. *All* expressions are *essentially* involved in *both* dimensions, at the dependent-representation end. In *some* cases, *other* linguistic expressions are *also* involved (in various different roles), in *intermediate* roles in at least the subjunctive tracking relations. These involvements of *other* expressions suffice for the expressions they play essential roles in the dependence relations of to qualify as *genuinely essentially* metalinguistic.

Q: Does this ever happen on the *normative* side?

That is, are linguistic expressions (representings, corresponding to S's "representations of rules") ever essentially involved in the way states of affairs normatively govern claimings using other linguistic expressions?

I would think that this might happen with all terms introduced by abstraction.

If so, does that *always* go along with playing such an essential mediating role on the subjunctive tracking side?

12. Alethic modal *locutions* are metalinguistic. But what they express is not. Ditto for (most) sentences and predicates, as well as terms (both singular and sortal).

The "space of implications", which Sellars uses to distinguish describing from mere labeling (classifying as mere differential responsiveness) which basically *is* the subjunctive tracking condition (not all labeling is in presence, or is a kind of report-label, so talk of labeling corresponds to the non-observational side of describing) is the criterion of *declarative sentencehood*. For it is the condition of concept-use, conceptual contentfulness, on the semantic side, and the speech act of *assertion*.

That 'space of implications', defining assertibles, expressed by declarative sentences (iron triangle of discursiveness, asserting, declarative sentences, claimable contents: pragmatic, syntactic, and semantic. More on this next meeting.)

- i. Consists of subjunctively robust implication or consequence relations (supporting inferring practices that go with the asserting practices of declarative sentence use), and
- ii. Should be taken to include incompatibilities as well. (I'll talk about this reason relation and its relation to consequence or implication next time.)

Conclusion:

I have offered relatively clear ways of making the notions of description, empirical description, and broad/narrow empirical description.

Description is distinguished from prescription Anscombe-wise, by direction of fit.

Empirical descriptions are picked out by the two-dimensional deontic/alethic account in terms of the combination of semantic normative governance and empirical subjunctive tracking.

Narrow empirical descriptions are picked out by the possibility of the subjunctive tracking aspect being satisfied without depending on the intermediate covariance with the tokening of any linguistic expression.

(This last offers a distinctive contrasting sense in which the use of some expressions can count as ‘metalinguistic’. For uses where it is *not* possible to have subjunctive tracking without going through the use of other linguistic expressions need not at all be talk *about* those intervening expressions. But playing this role can define also a distinctive sense of ‘object’ language (or base vocabulary). This will happen when the dependence is of the newly introduced abstract term upon the proper uses of the base vocabulary (object language), which is functioning here as more concrete. (Compare sets, elements, and urelements.)

Each of those definitions:

i) declaratives/assertibles, by ‘situation in a space of reasons’,

ii) descriptions by normative direction of fit,

iii) empirical descriptions by dual deontic/alethic criteria of semantic normative governance and epistemic subjunctive tracking, and

iv) narrowly empirically descriptive, by possibility of subjunctive tracking unmediated by tokenings of linguistic expressions in another vocabulary, is defined using metaconceptual raw materials Sellars provides.

I then used those four definitions to argue for the inclusion, in Sellars’s ‘world in the narrow sense’ of

- facts, properties, relations, events, and
- the subjunctively robust relations of implication and incompatibility that make up the “space of implications” needed for description, which are expressed by alethic modal vocabulary.
- But not for *abstracta* ‘in general.

The argument for the first three is that they are basically entailed already at the first, declarativist level, and get transmitted from there to everything below.

On this list, everything above (vii) *abstracta* I think *is* in the world in the narrow sense.

Abstracta split: I agree that *pure* abstracta, paradigmatically pure *sets*— \emptyset , $\{\emptyset\}$, $\{\emptyset, \{\emptyset\}\}$, $\{\{\emptyset\}\}$... can only be subjunctively tracked by reliably subjunctively covarying chains of events that include tokenings of linguistic expressions.

At least *some* abstractions from things and relations that *are* in the world in the narrow sense, though, I think are also in the world in the narrow sense.

Norms, (viii) I think *can* be in the world in the narrow sense, because nonlinguistic creatures have *affordances*. This is *primitive*, nonconceptual, nondiscursive normativity.

But *conceptual* normativity—and so meanings (ix)—are the paradigm of what is *not* in the world in the narrow sense.

- i. facts (states of affairs), picked out by nominalizations of sentences,
- ii. universals, picked out by nominalizations of monadic predicates,
- iii. relations, picked out by nominalizations of polyadic predicates,
- iv. kinds, picked out by nominalizations of sortal terms,
- v. events, picked out by nominalizations of sentences with temporal connectives,
- vi. subjunctively robust relations of consequence and incompatibility, expressed by alethic modal vocabulary,
- vii. *abstracta*, terms introduced by abstraction: an equivalence relation on relatively more concrete things picked out in a base vocabulary is treated as substitution-licensing identity,
- viii. norms: what is expressed by normative, specifically deontic vocabulary,
- ix. meanings, picked out by expressions that functionally classify other expressions.

Summary:

Nested Kinds of Use	Contrasts with	Defined by
Declaratives Most General Fact-Stating	Imperatives, Interrogatives	'Situation in space of implications' Assertible. Can be premises and conclusions of inferences Embeddable in conditionals and negations Truth-Evaluable
Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Prescriptions	Normative direction of fit is word to world
Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Fictional Descriptions	3) Normative governance of describings by describeds 4) Subjunctive tracking of describeds by describings
Narrowly Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Broadly Empirical Descriptions (Fact-Stating)	Subjunctive tracking not necessarily mediated by tokenings of linguistic expressions

Part II: Recollective Rationality and the Historical Dimension of Conceptual Content

1. The “isomorphisms are cheap” Putnamian objection to the significance of the Hlobil isomorphism is to be responded to by looking at ranges of subjunctive robustness, and normative governance. These are specified in alethic modal and deontic normative MVs. But it is this dual robustness, alethic and normative, that defines the relations between representings and representeds that matter—matter for reason relations.

The combined social-historical, but especially the *ASoT* historical reconstruction of sense/referent and attitude/status is supposed to be an account of how such a relationship is established or instituted and how it is maintained and developed. In *ASoT* I did not try to break down the alethic/deontic division of labor, or *explicitly* connect it to the status/attitude pair. This section of the course (Weeks 7, 8, 9) is an opportunity to rethink and redescribe this relationship.

The key element is retrospective recollective rationality. It is a kind of *redescription* (in a Rortyan sense) of a past, structuring it, identifying structures within it. This opposition is the making/finding one that the new (Hegelian, in *ASoT*) account of determinateness of conceptual content shows us can only properly be applied historically-pectively, as part of a larger whole that includes both aspects.

Recollecting a set of uses of expressions, a set of attitudes (the past) is a distinctive kind of *explicitation*. It is, for instance, quite different from *logical* explicitation, or the *rational* explicitation that is explicitly acknowledging as premises what had hitherto only been implied as consequences. Recollective explicitation makes explicit implicit norms in the form of statuses, which exercise a distinctive kind of authority over attitudes. Recollection is also the exercise of the authority of the attitudes (at least the recollecting attitudes) over (recollected) statuses.

2. Idea: **Recollection is privileging an explicitation path** that leads from ‘precedential’ past attitudes to the present constellation of commitments, simply by making explicit what was implicit in them, in the sense of what followed from them. But: many such paths are possible, and the recollector privileges one of them. I need not claim that this is *all* there is to recollection—just that this is one essential component of recollecting.

This claim is my punchline—in many ways, the punchline of the whole seminar: using the idea of explicitation paths to fill in structure to the notion of recollection. This story also offers a rationale for understanding recollection as a form of *rationality*. For it is privileging some extractions of reasons.

Recollection might rejigger the reason relations so as to *make* some actual path take the form of an explicitation path, by retrospectively-retroactively imputing a set of reason relations that makes an actual trajectory to the present *be* an explicitation path.

This is an important component of an actual analysis of how recollection works and what it is.

3. ***Recollection is redescription of one's current constellation of commitments as the result of an explicitation path*** including various earlier ones that are thereby treated as precedential. That it is an explicitation path is what it is for the privileged trajectory to be recollected as ***expressively progressive***. That is, the notion of an **explicitation path** is to be called on to fill in what it is for the privileged retrospective rational reconstruction to take the form of a path that is expressively progressive in that it is the unfolding or *emergence into explicitness* of commitments that can be seen retrospectively-recollectively as having been all along *implicit*.

The key move here is that the idea of explicitation paths, where explicitation is moving claimables from the right- to the left-hand side of the implication turnstile, is being offered as a reading of “expressive progressiveness” in the *ASoT* account of recollection. This ties that aspect of the story about *recollective rationality* in *ASoT* to the account of *rational explicitation hysteresis* as the result of the substructurality of material reason relations in *RLLR*.

This connection goes beyond both of those discussions, by combining them.

It is a major move, and a major punchline for the 7-8-9 segment of the seminar.

4. The social-recognitive account of the characteristic constellation of attitudes that institute statuses (discussed in Week 7, where we read my Brentano lecture on autonomy → recognition, as well as *AR5*) is taken up in its *historical* form in Week 8. There we see that the recollector gives *de re* characterizations of the conceptual contents of her predecessors, and that her own commitments can be similarly characterized by those who come after.

Another challenge of Week 9 is then not only to understand recollection as redescription as explicating (as in “The Explicitator”), but also folding in the distinctive combination of alethic-subjunctive and deontic-normative relations that begins in bimodal conceptual realism and continues to epistemic tracking and normative governance (which goes beyond *ATBUYO* bimodal conceptual realism).

5. Slogan: **Recollection is redescription as explicating.**

Note that using the whole apparatus to unpack (redescribe) redescription (a Rortyan trope) is made important by this conclusion to which we want to be entitled. The question is which relations between vocabularies amount to sharing a topic. This Q has multiple dimensions, one of which is dissecting to singular terms. Or, what is it to take two Vs to be codescriptional, in the sense of descriptions of the same. Social and historical dimensions contribute to this account. Redescription can be redescribed in terms of mappings of reason relations. Those might or might not admit referential-representational readings.

Understanding re- or codescription in terms of coreference at least invites, and perhaps presupposes, a bottom-up order of explanation/explication.

6. A recollection has three parts:

a). A set of meaning relations.

b) A trajectory through the set of attributed commitments that are being recollected, that is an explicitation path according to the meaning relations in (a),

c). that leads to the current state of the recollector.

I want to argue that recollection in the sense of (a) and (b), as an interpretation of the past that is the set (better: constellation, because it is structured) of recollected commitments (attributed by recollector) is in general only possible if the meaning relations in (a) are *open* structured (substructural, in the tradition that takes closure structure as the standard).

I don't want to say that either of (a) or (b) must precede the other, along any dimension. The relation between them is what I specify, in terms of the notion of explicitation paths, as illustrated by "The Explicitator.". One might start with a view about the meaning relation, and look for an explicating path leading to one's favored view. Or one might start with such a trajectory (which must be justified in the sense of being *explained*—as opposed to *explicitated*—by appeal to some other vocabulary) and cut and fit a constellation of meaning relations that make that trajectory an explicative path. Those are methodologically different ways of exploiting the relations between (a), (b), and (c).

7. All this suggests a different task for The Explicitator: Picking a constellation of commitments from the powerset lattice, determine retrospectively all the explicitation paths that lead to it.

8. In Week 8 (social) emphasize the attitude/status distinction, which is an essentially social phenomenon, underlying acknowledging/attribution, which are social attitudes towards statuses. Then in Week 9 (historical), traditional/modern as status-dependence of attitudes and attitude-dependence of statuses, and recollection as a way of adapting social structure diachronically to reconcile the traditional and the modern insights. Doing this reconciling of the normative authority claims of attitudes and statuses is a necessary condition of saying how OED conceptual contents are shaped and (further) determined. But the purely normative issue can be addressed antecedently and in at least some independence from the semantic determination issue. All this is to set up the punchline in Week 9, when recollection is redescribed (not defined) in terms of explicitation paths normatively governed by (statuses, not attitudes) hypernonmonotonic reason relations.

Week 9 must also reconcile this story with the double structure of alethic/deontic: for semantics/pragmatics (world/words), but also for the subjunctive epistemic tracking (by

attitudes, of states) and normative governance relations (of attitudes by states) that institute, maintain, and improve the isomorphism at the level of reason relations in the two media.